| | | 企业创新竞争的期权博弈行为分析
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[内容摘要]本文在不确定环境中，探讨专利权体制下实物期权与创新竞争的工商管理学论文相互关系，建立模型刻画了两个对称企业在合作与非合作情况下进行创新投资的工商管理学论文最佳策略。企业间的竞争并不一定损害延迟期权的价值，相反，企业对引发专利竞争的畏惧使竞争的影响内在化，进一步提高了延迟的价值，推迟了投资时间。
[关键词]创新竞争；实物期权；非合作博弈；投资延迟
Abstract: This paper considers the tension between real options and R&D competition with uncertainty under a winner-takes-all patent system. It models the optimal rules for two symmetric firms for their cooperative and non-cooperative investment. It has shown that competition between firms does not necessarily undermine the option to delay. Instead the fear of sparking a patent race may internalize the effect of competit
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